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Animal Protection and Animal ’Rights’ in Hungary 
 
 
 
I. A brief theoretical historical introduction 
 
The animals’ welfare is not an ancient postulate; it is only the product of the modern 
era. After the World War II. the idea of ’humanity’ spread out to such spheres that had been 
imaginable prior to that. In the philosphical thinking the idea that animals, or at least certain 
kinds of animals, are sentient beings that deserve protection from being harmed, both 
physically and psychically, appeared in the ’70s in the Western countries. This view, 
however, had a long journey to go. For example, Descartes deemed that animals are, simply, 
machines, no different in principle from clocks. He denied that they have minds, and, 
consequently, thought they lack reason.
2
 Kant did not recognise animals as moral agents 
either, viz., on the ground that they are not autonomous, that is, they are not ends-in-
themselves, in contrast to humans, but he stated it is immoral to be cruel to them. He claimed 
that those people who hurt animals are more likely to be capable of hurting other humans, 
too.
3
 The first real pioneer of the case for animals’ weal was, however, Jeremy Bentham, the 
English utilitarian philosopher. He believed that particular animal entities are sensitive beings
4
 
at least to the same extent as certain humans. As he wrote: “The day may come, when the rest 
of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from 
them but by the hand of tyranny. … It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of 
the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally 
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate?”5 Namely, “the question is not, 
Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”6 And the answer, that is being 
recognised at present, is that yes, they as living entities capable of feelings can suffer and feel 
pain.
7
 On the basis of this recognition did the regulations come into being across the Western 
countries in the 70’s, 80’s and 90’s which began to protect certain kinds of animals from 
unnecessary physical pain and mental suffering that humans can cause, either with intent or 
by recklessness, to them.  
Nevertheless, these regulations do not ban people from killing animals, only prescribe 
that this killing is legally possible in certain instances and without causing animals needless 
suffering. For example, slaughter in abattoirs is not legally forbidden and this is also the case 
concerning animal experiments, albeit in the most modern philosophical debates there are 
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standpoints which deem that using animals for, among others, drug experiments or eating 
them is morally unjustifiable and, consequently, ought to be prohibited by national laws.
8
 In 
Hungary, in accordance with the international trends, there are no explicit rules on animal 
’rights’ like that; the Hungarian law merely limits the cruel treatment of animals.9 
 
 
 
II. The regulation in Hungary 
 
In Hungary, the first law on animal protection was enacted in 1998 (numbered and 
named as Act XXVIII of 1998 on Protection and Careful Treatment of Animals, hereafter: 
’Act on Animal Protection’ or ’Animal Protection Act’) and it entered into force in 1999. The 
preamble of this law declares the principle that “animals are living entities capable of feeling, 
suffering and expressing happiness”; therefore, “respecting them and ensuring that they would 
generally feel good shall be everyone’s moral obligation”. (In this way, the doctrines formed 
by Bentham two centuries ago are now basically accepted.) The justification for this Act 
confirms that legislative motive that some animals (typically vertebrates) are living creatures 
capable of emotions and expressing happiness, satisfaction, and terror. The declared purpose 
of the Act is to advance the protection of entities in the animal world, which means that 
protection shall be granted not to human beings but rather to animals as individual living 
creatures. The former regulation on nature and environment, and even the nineteenth-century 
prohibition of animal torture in Act XL of 1879 (the so called “Code on Petty Offences” 
which supplemented the Hungarian Penal Code) focused on the protection of human beings’ 
living conditions, calmness, and sense of morality instead of the emotions, pains, and needs of 
animals.
10
 Consequently, the Hungarian Act on Animal Protection is a significant 
advancement in the way of treating animals as individuals and self-values, and it considers the 
protection of these entities important for itself (and not for the reason for ensuring people’s 
interests). In Hungary, this Act protects animals in many ways. It forbids, for example, animal 
torture, training animals for fighting, and force-feeding animals. It is against the law to force 
animals to perform activities substantially above their abilities or to subject them to unnatural 
and self-abusive activities.
11
 The justification for the Act also argues that animal-keepers shall 
have certain obligations with regard to animals; they shall look after them, and this legal 
obligation is morally grounded and established.  
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It is interesting to note, that the Act provides an exception to the prohibition on force-
feeding animals: it is still permissible to force-feed ducks and geese by domestic and 
traditional methods. One of the most important products exported by Hungary is fat goose-
liver. 1800-1900 tons of fat goose-liver are produced by Hungary annually,
12
 and 
approximately 75% of that amount will be exported.
13
 The most significant demand market is 
France,
14
 so it is not accidental that French farmers regularly protest against the import of 
Hungarian fat goose-liver, and they demand protectionist measures by the French 
government. The other noteworthy exception of an agricultural nature applies to goose-feather 
stripping. It must be noted, however, that in connection with goose-feather stripping some 
hysteria has been generated in an artificial way. Nowadays, goose-feathers are not ’stripped’ 
as in the past; feathers are not torn out of the live tissue of the animal, only the feathers whose 
end has become keratinized are pulled out from the goose. This method, if appropriately 
applied, should not cause any pain or suffering to the goose since the animal would shed such 
overmature feathers anyhow. By the way, rather rigorous regulations apply to feather 
stripping. It is forbidden, for example, to wet geese feather, choke the windpipe of the birds, 
or to carry out feather-plucking in a temperature below an average of 15 degrees Celsius. 
Should skin injury occur, then it should immediately be treated by veterinary medical 
products. 
A further provision of the Act on Animal Protection regarding individual animal 
entities is to guarantee that animal-keepers are obliged to provide animals with living 
conditions suitable for their physiological needs, adequate and safe shelters, and enough space 
for their normal healthy movement. It is forbidden to oust, get rid of, or desert a 
(domesticated) animal. No surgical interventions are allowed for non-medical or non-
sterilization reasons, but purely for altering animals’ appearance.15 
The Act generally stipulates that animals shall not be killed for reasons and under 
circumstances that are unacceptable or intolerable. The crucial and debatable point of this 
regulation is the question of what is to be considered ’an acceptable reason or circumstance’. 
Pursuant to the Act on Animal Protection the purpose of nutrition, fur production, animal 
stock control, incurable diseases, injuries, the danger of infections, pests clearing, the 
prevention of otherwise unavoidable attacks and, finally, scientific research are deemed to be 
such acceptable reasons and circumstances.
16
 This section of the Act was modified not long 
ago, namely in November, 2011 by the Hungarian Parliament,
17
 and it now regulates that only 
chinchillas and angora rabbits may be used for purposes of fur production. (The rationale for 
this regulation is that, besides these animals, others have practically never been bred for the 
sake of their fur for almost two decades now. It is interesting to note, by the way, that should 
anyone insist on breeding other animals for fur production, and should the authorities become 
aware of such an activity, if those animals could not be sheltered in a zoo, then they would 
have to be killed in order to preserve the present state of Hungary’s fauna.18 This may be 
regarded as a rather strange provision in a law on animal protection. 
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As a further modification in the new regulation, the Act stipulates that in the case of 
breeding dogs and cats, the purpose of nutrition and fur production shall not be deemed as 
acceptable reasons. Moreover, irrespective of the aim of breeding, it is unacceptable that dogs 
or cats be used for nutrition or fur production.
19
 According to the justification for the 
amendment of the Act, the explicit enactment of such prohibitions are necessary because, due 
to globalization, more and more minorities live now in Hungary who from time to time are 
suspected or alleged to eat dogs or cats although none of these suspicions or allegations have 
ever been proven to date. Since this is alien to Hungarian customs, the amendment of the Act 
on Animal Protection has set forth these prohibitions with preventive intentions; however, 
Regulation 1523/2007/EC, which shall be directly applicable in all EU Member States 
including Hungary as well, also sets forth such prohibitions.  
Finally, a further curiosity in the amendment is that in the future, after the entry into 
force thereof, dogs can be declared dangerous only in cases if the behaviour of the individual 
dog itself gives grounds for that, and complete races of dogs cannot be declared dangerous. 
The score of it was a decision by the Hungarian Constitutional Court
20
 in which it held that 
the Government Decree No. 35/1997. (II. 26.) which declared the pitbull terriers dangerous is 
unconstitutional because pitbull terriers cannot be differentiated unequivocally from 
staffordshire terriers. Hence, the amendment of the Act on Animal Protection enacted a new 
provision in the Act which disposes that ”dangerous dog is a dog that is declared dangerous 
by the animal protection authority”.21 
Returning to the original text of the Act on Animal Protection, the Act – in order to 
ensure humane treatment (sic!) (this term expressly appears in the Act’s justification as it is) – 
also stipulates that animals are only allowed to be killed after they are drugged (except for 
some special cases, e.g. the cutting of rabbits or poultry).
22
 Animals therefore can be killed, 
but their unnecessary suffering must be prevented and this applies to both physical and mental 
suffering. 
Based on this, if animals which are raised, for example, for their meat and dairy 
products are not slaughtered immediately, then they have to be fed and provided with a restful 
environment for the period awaiting their eventual slaughter.
23
 (At the same time, it must be 
mentioned that not only compulsory but ritual slaughter of animals is allowed as well.)
24
 
Slaughter methods regarded to be ’humane’ by the implementation degree of the Act may 
include use of pistols, trauma caused by fatal head concussion (i.e. striking animals dead), 
electrocution, carbon-dioxide gas, beheading, and twisting the neck of poultry and other birds, 
or in the case of some birds (like quails, partridges or pheasants) use of vacuum-chambers, 
and with respect to furred animals use of various gases, electrocution or pistols in addition to 
drugs with hypnotic effects.
25
 
Furthermore, during the transportation of animals, causing unnecessary suffering or 
pain must be avoided, adequate drinking water, food, and appropriate litter must be provided, 
injuries must be avoided, enough space for movement and protection against adverse weather 
conditions should be provided, enough air should be supplied as well as a solid slip-proof 
flooring.
26
 The same must apply to the circumstances and conditions of animal retention in the 
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case of animals kept for experimental purposes. Consequently, animal experiments are 
allowed in Hungary, but only by obeying strict rules.  
Animal experiments are forbidden, for example, for the purpose of producing and 
manufacturing cosmetics, tobacco, other luxury goods, guns or ammunition.
27
 For all animal 
experiments, a license issued by the competent authority is required.
28
 Animal experiments 
have to be carried out in a way that would cause animals the least possible pain and suffering, 
and should affect the least number of animal subjects.
29
 If there is an alternative scientific 
method which would lead to the same result without carrying out animal experiments, then 
animal experiments are forbidden.
30
 Finally, if an animal during the experiment suffers 
serious health impairment, then it should be killed in a humane way.
31
 (In fact, the 
implementation decree of the Act goes as far as regulating that smoking is forbidden in the 
premises where animals are kept, an optimal level of humidity must be provided, noises, 
unexpected sounds and vibrations must be eliminated, and light and dark periods must be 
alternated etc.)
32
 
The amendment adopted in November, 2011 also prohibits using live animals as raffle 
prizes.
33
 The reason for that is that the winners of such animals are usually unprepared to keep 
them in proper conditions; therefore, the animals’ welfare is threatened in many cases of 
them. Another interesting thing related to this is that the Hungarian regulation ensures the so-
called ’animal euthanasia’, i.e. mercy killing of animals in order to avoid or prevent the 
unnecessary prolongation of their suffering.
34
 Should the survivorship of animals be 
accompanied by suffering that cannot be terminated or alleviated, and the recovery of such 
animals cannot be expected, then their owners or, in absence of their owners or when the 
owner is unknown, the animal health control authority (the Central Agricultural Office 
/CAO/) is obliged to take measures for killing the animals in a way that would not cause them 
pain.
35
 If these regulations are violated, the CAO is entitled to impose an animal protection 
fine
36
 ranging from 5,000 HUF to 150,000 HUF (about from 16 up to 500 EUR).
37
 Along 
with or instead of such fine, the CAO may prohibit offenders from keeping animals (or from 
keeping certain animals) for a period of 2-8 years, or it may require them to participate in 
special programs on animal protection, with the purpose of ensuring that all the above 
mentioned regulations are obeyed.
38
 
39
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 It is worth mentioning here that the institution of the Hungarian ombudsman for evironmental cases (officially, 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations; colloquially, the ‘green ombudsman’) was abolished 
on January 1, 2012. On this date the new Constitution of Hungary entered into force that new provisions 
introduced into the Hungarian law. For example, among others, the ombudsman system was rearranged, viz., in 
lieu of the four up to now autonomous ombudsmen only one remained. The ombudsman for data protection and 
freedom of information was totally ceased, and the up to now ombudsman (parliamentary commissioner) for the 
 In the most severe cases, however, when animals are killed or tortured without any reason, 
even criminal sanctions can be imposed following 2004
40
 (see: Hungarian Act on the Criminal 
Code Section 266/B. on “Cruelty to Animals”).41 Nevertheless, Hungarian courts have not 
sentenced any animal torturer to imprisonment so far although suspended prison sentences 
have already been imposed in several cases. 
 
 
 
III. An outlook: On the rights of animals – in abstracto 
 
The distribution of legal rights (in this case: entitlements, further: ’rights’) and obligations 
among the members of society, and defining their contents depend on the substantial sources 
of law (on the conscious lawmaker or – in the case of customary law – on its unconscious 
creators as such). (And the actual substantial source of law depends on the related existing 
belief of a large part of the community. /The essence of this concept is expressed in the best 
way possible by the „rule of recognition” category of Hart42./) Briefly: from among the 
members of the community regulated by a given legal order that member has a right and in 
that respect, for whom and for which respect the legislator (precisely: the lawmaker) 
acknowledges it in any of the positive rules of law. In the lack of such an acknowledgment, 
from the aspect of positive law, we cannot talk about ’rights’ (’entitlements’). 
Therefore the source of legal rights in the modern positivized law systems is the 
lawmaker; however, first of all we should clarify what these so called ’legal rights’ are. In 
generally we say the following: if a person has legal rights (in other words if he or she is the 
subject of entitlements) means that certain things advantageous for him or her may be due to 
that person, and, also, that acknowledging and honouring it is the obligation of everyone else. 
It is a consequence of this that the rights always imply the obligations; the legal relationship 
(’legal right relationship’) is a relation that has an absolute structure: on one side there is the 
possibility of the subject to use the option that is defined by his or her entitlement and to 
enjoy it or its consequences, while on the other side everybody else is obliged to refrain from 
limiting, hindering or preventing the exercising or enjoyment of the given entitlement.
43
 There 
is only one exception therefrom: in case a right of mine in a specific situation would infringe 
the right of other legal subject(s), then from among the competing rights that right will prevail 
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which had been declared by the lawmaker to be of a higher level. (If this cannot be decided, 
then this interpretation will have to ultimately be decided by the judge within the frameworks 
of positive law.)
44
 Moreover, the existence of a legal right does not require that the subject of 
the entitlement should be able to enforce it; it is only required that somebody (lawful 
representative, prosecutor, NGO entitled to initiate an actio popularis etc.) should be able to 
enforce the right. 
Therefore in the above we defined the essence of the existence of entitlements and 
what conditions have to be met if we wish to talk about rights (facultas agendi). Now we 
already may look for accurately answering the question to whom the entitlements are due, that 
is, theoretically who can be and who cannot be their subjects. Our definition concerning this is 
the following: the subject of a legal right can be a person, who is able or potentially will be 
(may be) able in the future to exercise the opportunity that is ensured by the legal right or to 
perceive the consequences of such an advantage.
45
 Therefore it is not a prerequisite that this 
entity should also know or should recognise in the future at any time that this (the situation 
ensured through the advantage) is the realisation ensured by law of the possibility favourable 
for him/her/it (that is it is the consequence of his/her/its entitlement), and it is not a 
prerequisite either that he/she/it should be able to perceive, recognise or feel that he/she/it has 
so-called ’rights’. In this sense any entity may be the subject of a legal right, who or what is 
able to feel, either now or in the future, the advantages and their impacts as facts; this beyond 
dispute (even according to the effective Hungarian Civil Code as well) refers to children, the 
mentally retarded and the nascituri/nasciturae (unborn children) as well,
46
 but it does not 
refer to lifeless matters, since they can be brought under regulation purely as legal objects.  
This is the point where the question may be raised whether anything outside humans 
having at least potentially mental powers e.g. animals can be the subjects of legal rights as 
well. As regards animals (more exactly as regards a certain part of them), today it may still 
seem to be a little bit strange that we are talking about ’rights’, however, according to the 
above definition (the subject of a legal right can be a person, who is able or potentially will be 
/may be/ able in the future to exercise the opportunity that is ensured by the legal right or to 
perceive the consequences of such an advantage), animals are not excluded ab ovo from the 
possibility of becoming subjects of rights;
47
 for this only one condition has to be met: the law 
(the legal order, that is, the effective laws in the given legal system /norma agendi/) should 
acknowledge that they have certain defined rights. Therefore the subject status of animals 
depends only on state recognition: positive law may have any kind of provisions in this 
regard, the same way as it can have any kind of provisions as regards people (or specific 
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47
 They may not have obligations due to their nature, the same way as unborn children and infants that obviously 
do not have the sense of understanding also cannot have obligations. 
group of people).
48
 If according to the positive law animals are not subjects of law, that is, 
they do not have any rights in any respect, then in the given law system animals will not have 
any rights. (This was the situation in the case of most of the legal systems till the 20th 
century, disregarding some exceptions – for example according to preceding Indian law(s) 
cows were considered to be saint animals and were given rights.) However, if the rules of a 
positive law system recognise the legal subject status of certain animals (at least as regards 
certain issues), then the given animals (in respect of these issues) will be actually the subjects 
of these entitlements. 
The main question is whether for a modern 21st century state it is proper, morally 
justifiable or rational to apply this recognition. If we start out from the requirement of moral 
consistency (which says that objects that are, as regards their relevant attributes, identical with 
one another have to be managed the same way, and for managing them in a different manner 
we have to certify the actual difference between the objects that we wish to manage 
differently), then no other answer than yes may be given to this question, at least in respect of 
certain animals. 
As we have mentioned above, the legal subject status of animals depends up to a 
certain extent (up to the point it is conceptually not excluded) from its recognition by positive 
law, that is, from its definition. And this „border” obviously (due to the nature of the thing) is 
the (existing or potential future) capability of perception of a certain level, therefore an animal 
that does not have this capability and may not have such a capability, conceptually cannot 
have a legal subject status. Consequently, conceptually (due to the nature of the thing) it is 
excluded to give rights to those animals (or, for example, to any plants, of course) that do not 
have this minimal mental capability. At the same time due to the requirement of moral 
consistency it is not justifiable that, if a positive law system ensures the rights of an injured, 
mentally ill or mentally retarded person, who is unable to think or who is hardly able to think, 
moreover of an anencephalic infant, who does not have a brain core responsible for cognitive 
functions (as it is, certainly, proper that a law system does so), then why this same positive 
law system should not ensure at least certain rights, e.g. being free from torture, of at least 
those animals that are capable of certain, elementary (or even more developed), level of 
thinking.
49
 Denying this is nothing else but speciesism, that is, discrimination between the 
species which morally is not different at all from racism or sexism.
50
 
As regards the Hungarian legal system, the above-mentioned Section 266/B of the 
Criminal Code, which protects the animal entities from suffering pains by declaring ’cruelty 
to animals’ a criminal act, may be considered to by such a right (albeit this rule refers only to 
vertebrates),
51
 but it is not excluded that Hungarian courts will interpret in the future in a 
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 Based only on the fact that a slave society or a state recognising slavery does not consider the slaves as legal 
subjects, only as legal objects, it cannot be said as regards positive law that these systems are not law systems, it 
can only be stated that this is not ’just’ or ’fair’, however, law or „legality”  is not an issue of evaluation, but it is 
an issue of fact. (Otherwise we could not recognise the rules created by the organisations of the Roman Empire 
to be a „law”.) 
49
 With this we are not denying that the value of the specific living entities cannot be different, but we recognise 
that causing pain is harmful for all sentient beings capable of feeling pain, and not only for those who have 
developed cognitive capabilities, therefore narrowing down protection exclusively to the latter ones cannot be 
justified from moral aspect. (In respect of this see: Singer: Animal Liberation /op. cit./ pp. 20-21.) 
50
 As Tom Regan writes: ”An individual’s race, gender, ethnicity, and class provide no basis whatsoever for 
ascribing different moral or legal rights. The same is no less true of a difference in species. Only prejudice 
permits the contrary.” (Regan, Tom: The Day May Come: Legal Rights for Animals. In: Animal Law, 2004, p. 
23.) And the same from Peter Singer: ”[t]o discriminate against beings solely on account of their species is a 
form of prejudice, immoral and indefensible in the same way that discrimination on the basis of race is immoral 
and indefensible.” (Singer: Animal Liberation /op. cit./ p. 243.) 
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 The criminal code rule that prohibits the torturing of vertebrates authorises these animal entities with the right 
that they do not have to endure the pains that are caused by people intentionally and needlessly, and it makes the 
similar manner certain provisions of the Animal Protection Act as well (even if they do not do 
so at present). 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is obvious, that Hungarian animal protection has caught up with the practice of 
modern European countries, and even if it is problematic whether animals are entitled to 
subjective rights to avoid physical and mental torture,
52
 or if these provisions simply embody 
people’s obligations against other people in order to protect their sense of morality, there is no 
doubt that the Hungarian regulation regards the individual animal lives as extraordinary value, 
and that the provisions in the Act on Animal Protection or another legal norms grant all 
possible guarantees required in our days. However, the next step in the stair of right-giving 
has to be the recognition of at least certain animal entities’ subjective rights, not only in 
Hungary but in all the other modern, developed countries with the idea of rule of law as well. 
                                                                                                                                                        
obligors of this absolute structure legal relation all humans (the same way as the rules that protect human life, the 
intactness of the human body or human health ensure the right of humans to the physical integrity of their 
bodies, making it an obligation for all other humans to refrain from these kind of activities). That is, if we 
compare for example the fact of ’injuring the body’ and ’animal torture’, then we can see that the former one 
does not differ structurally, as regards its impact and implications from the latter one (the only difference exists 
as regards the subject side). 
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 This seems to be proven by the fact that Act X of 2004, which made ’cruelty to animals’ part of the Hungarian 
Act on the Criminal Code, acknowledges individual animals as subjects of legal protection and thus as obligees 
of the crime. Pursuant to the justification of this act, the legal object defended by the crime (apart from the 
maintenance of public order) shall be “the protection of the life and health of the animal as a creature capable of 
emotions”. (See: Norbert Kis /ed./: The Commentary of the Penal Code. Volume III.: Criminal Law Special (2). 
p. 988.) 
